www.banksters.us: 01/01/2015

Friday, January 23, 2015

U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara Challenges Insider Trading Ruling

from nytimes

JANUARY 23, 2015 5:45 PM

Updated, 8:52 p.m. | When an appeals court overturned the convictions of two hedge fund managers last month, the ruling reverberated throughout the legal world and rewrote the government’s insider trading playbook.

Now, federal prosecutors in Manhattan are disclosing their strategy to reverse the ruling, or at least narrow it.

In a filing late Friday, the prosecutors mounted a two-pronged challenge to the appellate ruling. Preet Bharara, the United States attorney in Manhattan, is asking the same three-judge panel that issued the ruling to revisit its decision, which imposed the greatest limits on insider trading prosecutions in decades.

“The opinion breaks with Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent, conflicts with the decisions of other circuits and threatens the effective enforcement of securities laws,” prosecutors said in a 25-page petition.

As an alternative, the spokesman said, Mr. Bharara’s filing will propose the legal equivalent of a do-over in a process known as en banc. The process would require every judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to hear the case.

While both requests could be long shots — since 2012, the Second Circuit has held only one en banc hearing involving as many as 15 appellate judges — the prosecutors’ requests might lay the groundwork for an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. That route could fail as well, or even generate a worse outcome for the government, but it might also nudge the three-judge panel to voluntarily clarify aspects of its ruling.

For Mr. Bharara, the outcome is critical. His office has won more than 80 convictions from his campaign to root out insider trading on Wall Street.

And now, his decision to appeal will escalate a battle that will shape the boundaries of insider trading law for decades to come.

If successful, it could also curb the broader fallout from the three-judge panel’s decision to overturn the convictions of Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson, the hedge fund managers who were tried together in 2012.

The panel ruled that the judge who presided over their trial set too low a bar for conviction when instructing jurors. Its decision not only dismissed the cases against Mr. Newman and Mr. Chiasson, it also threatened a number of Mr. Bharara’s other signature convictions.

The insider trading conviction of Michael Steinberg, a onetime rainmaker at SAC Capital Advisors, the once-mighty hedge fund that Mr. Bharara indicted in 2013, would most likely be overturned if the three-judge panel’s ruling goes unchallenged. The judge who presided over Mr. Steinberg’s trial and provided the jury instruction, Richard J. Sullivan, also handled Mr. Chiasson and Mr. Newman’s trial.

The ripple effect has spread to other cases — and other jurisdictions.

After the appellate ruling — written by Judge Barrington D. Parker, Judge Ralph K. Winter Jr. and Judge Peter W. Hall — a number of defendants convicted of insider trading in New York and elsewhere have sought to have the charges against them dismissed. For example, lawyers for some of the cooperating witnesses who pleaded guilty and testified against Mr. Newman, Mr. Chiasson and Mr. Steinberg have signaled they might consider reopening those guilty pleas if the appellate ruling stands.

And on Thursday, a federal judge threw out guilty pleas from four men charged with trading on inside information involving shares ofIBM. The judge, Andrew L. Carter Jr. of the Federal District Court in Manhattan, cited the appellate ruling in entering not guilty pleas. He is still deciding whether the charges in that case should be dismissed in light of the appellate ruling.

The developments fulfilled Mr. Bharara’s predictions at the time of the appellate ruling in December, when he warned of a chilling effect. The ruling, he said then, “interprets the securities laws in a way that will limit the ability to prosecute people who trade on leaked inside information.”

At the heart of the three-judge panel’s decision to overturn the convictions of Mr. Newman and Mr. Chiasson is a question of what the two traders knew about a leak of inside information. Rejecting Judge Sullivan’s instructions to the jury, the appellate panel ruled that Mr. Chiasson and Mr. Newman needed to know that insiders at technology companies were improperly leaking confidential information to hedge funds in exchange for some “personal benefit.”

In the case, the tips started with insiders at Dell and Nvidia and ricocheted around the country before reaching Mr. Newman and Mr. Chiasson. Those extra layers, the panel concluded, meant that Mr. Newman and Mr. Chiasson would not have known of any such benefit.

The panel then took its ruling a step further, challenging the very notion of what constitutes a benefit. It is this aspect of the ruling that has disturbed prosecutors the most.

In this case, prosecutors had argued that mere friendship, or even something as simple as career advice, was enough to prove that a Dell employee received a benefit from leaking inside information. But the appellate court rejected that standard as low, saying the government must also show that the tipper expected to receive something “of some consequence,” although it did not specify what that must be.

“The panels’ erroneous definition of the personal benefit requirement will dramatically limit the government’s ability to prosecute some of the most common culpable and market threatening forms of insider trading,” the petition said.

Federal prosecutors have suggested, both publicly at legal conferences and privately, that this new definition could produce some extreme and unwanted results. Prosecutors have said this more constricted view of a benefit might make it difficult to file charges against, say, a parent who passes on a confidential stock tip to one of his children without receiving anything in return. Others have invoked the classic case of the corporate chief executive whispering to a friend on the golf course about a coming acquisition.

A number of defense lawyers have dismissed the nightmare situations that prosecutors have raised.

But in Los Angeles, James V. Mazzo, the executive of a medical device company accused of providing inside information to the former professional baseball player Doug DeCinces, has asserted that the indictment against him should be dismissed given the appellate ruling. He contends the government has not shown that he received any direct personal benefit for purportedly tipping Mr. DeCinces about an impending corporate deal.

Mr. Bharara still has time to appeal the ruling to the United States Supreme Court, but to do so, he would need the approval of the United States solicitor general, Donald B. Verrilli Jr., who also signs off on requests for en banc proceedings. But such an appeal, a process known as a writ of certiorari, is seldom granted.

Former prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers had said before the filing that Mr. Bharara’s best course of action would be to ask the same three-judge appellate to rehear the case to modify its ruling. A rehearing by an appellate panel rarely results in the final decision being overturned but sometimes does lead the panel to make adjustments that clarify its ruling.

Other legal experts have called for Congress to intervene, noting that the act of insider trading is not explicitly prohibited in a federal statute. Instead, a patchwork of legal opinions and regulations constitute the law.

“The decision is a reasonable interpretation of bad law that yields a bad result,” said Erik Gordon, a professor of business at theUniversity of Michigan Ross School of Business. “Insider trading is a term that doesn’t even appear in securities law. The law of insider trading has been built and rebuilt on a rickety tower.”

Wednesday, January 14, 2015

JPMorgan Chase Chief Says ‘Banks Are Under Assault’

from nytimes

By NATHANIEL POPPER

JANUARY 14, 2015 7:31 AM

Updated, 8:59 p.m. | As JPMorgan Chase reported sluggish earnings and potential new legal costs on Wednesday, its chief executive,Jamie Dimon, lashed out at regulators and analysts, including some who are calling for the breakup of what is the nation’s largest bank.

The bank announced that both its revenue and profit were down during the fourth quarter of 2014, with few bright spots across its many business lines.

The bank’s profits were also dragged down by $1 billion it put aside to deal with a government investigation of wrongdoing on its foreign currency trading desks. The bank has also begun preparing for new rules that are expected to be tougher on JPMorgan than any other financial firm.

During conference calls with reporters and analysts, Mr. Dimonsounded like a chief executive under siege.

“Banks are under assault,” Mr. Dimon said in the call with reporters. “In the old days, you dealt with one regulator when you had an issue. Now it’s five or six. You should all ask the question about how American that is, how fair that is.”

This is not the first time that Mr. Dimon has publicly criticized the new scrutiny and rules that banks have dealt with since the financial crisis. But in the past, Mr. Dimon was often confronting skeptics from outside the banking world. On Wednesday, he faced off against several industry analysts who questioned whether the costs associated with JPMorgan’s heft are outweighing the benefits.

“This is not Elizabeth Warren asking the questions,” said Mike Mayo, a bank analyst at CLSA, referring to the Massachusetts senator and outspoken critic of big banks. “Investors are talking about this.”

Mr. Dimon and Marianne Lake, JPMorgan’s chief financial officer, rebutted any suggestion that JPMorgan would need to be broken into smaller parts to be more valuable, and argued that the bank’s size gave it many advantages against competitors — “the model works from a business standpoint,” Mr. Dimon said.

But some of the analysts questioning Mr. Dimon and Ms. Lake did not seem to be satisfied by the answers and suggested that they expected to hear more about the bank’s efforts to change itself.

The company’s share price ended the day down 3.5 percent, at $56.81.

Mr. Mayo, who was one of the first analysts to call for the big banks to be broken up, pointed out on Wednesday that as JPMorgan had continued to grow it had actually become somewhat less efficient, as measured by the ratio between its expenses and revenue.

When the questions about the bank’s future kept coming on Wednesday morning, Mr. Dimon sounded increasingly frustrated with the analysts.

“This company has been a fortress company,” he said. “It has delivered to clients and its diversification is the reason why it’s had less volatility of earnings and was able to go through the crisis and never lost money ever, not one quarter.”

The bank’s fourth-quarter results, while disappointing, were not terrible for shareholders. The bank said its earnings fell 7 percent, to $4.9 billion, or $1.19 a share, from $5.6 billion, or $1.30 a share, in the period a year earlier. The results fell short of the $1.31 a share expected by analysts surveyed by Thomson Reuters.

Net revenue at the bank dropped 3 percent, to $22.5 billion, from the fourth quarter of 2013. On a so-called managed basis, revenue was $23.55 billion, slightly below the $23.6 billion anticipated by analysts.

For 2014 as a whole, JPMorgan reported profit of $21.8 billion, a 21 percent increase over 2013, and the highest ever annual profit for the company.

In the third quarter of 2014, JPMorgan’s Wall Street operations bolstered the results of the bank. But in the fourth quarter, the difficult trading conditions that have hurt profits at Wall Street firms over the last few years returned.

Revenue from JPMorgan’s once-lucrative fixed-income trading business fell 32 percent from the previous quarter and was down 23 percent from the period a year earlier. Much of the decline was because of businesses that JPMorgan had sold. But core trading was also down 14 percent.

JPMorgan’s enormous consumer bank also had a drop in revenue in several areas, including credit cards and mortgages, which has slowed down as the national housing market has cooled off.

The bank has been able to attribute some of its disappointing results in recent years to the enormous fines that it has had to pay for wrongdoing before and during the financial crisis.

But while those legal expenses were expected to eventually recede, they have kept coming. This quarter, JPMorgan set aside $1.1 billion — $990 million after taxes — to deal primarily with an industrywide investigation of manipulation in the foreign currency markets. It set aside a similar amount in the previous quarter, but the potential severity of the wrongdoing appears to have increased since then.

Mr. Dimon said that the bank was still bracing for more fines. “It’s going to cost us several billion dollars more somehow plus or minus another couple billion before we get to normal.”

Mr. Dimon said the bank took responsibility for some of the problems that have led to penalties, but he complained that it had been unfair when multiple regulators had come after the bank for the same issue.

The more enduring challenge for the bank, though, may be the new requirements that the bank maintain higher levels of capital than other banks because of its size.

A Federal Reserve official said in December that JPMorgan would most likely to have to raise over $20 billion of new capital, either by holding on to profits or selling more shares to investors. The bank is the only one that is expected to have to raise significant amounts of new capital.

A bank analyst at Goldman Sachs said this month that because of the price that JPMorgan was paying for its size, it may be worth less in its current form than it would be if it was broken apart. On Wednesday, multiple analysts said that regulators seemed to want JPMorgan to be smaller.

Mr. Dimon acknowledged that there could be a point when the additional costs could force it to spin off some businesses. “If the regulators at the end of the day want JPMorgan to be split up, then that’s what will have to happen,” he said. “We can’t fight the federal government if that’s their intent.”

But Mr. Dimon said that his team was confident that the bank would manage to comply with the rules as they have currently been outlined without any major changes. Invoking patriotism, he warned that if his company was forced to shrink, it could open the door for foreign competitors, especially those from China.

“America has been the leader in global capital markets for the last 50, 100 years,” he said. “I look at it as a matter of public policy. I wouldn’t want to see the next JPMorgan Chase be a Chinese company.”

Sunday, January 11, 2015

Obama Lied About His Intent to Prosecute Wall Street Banksters

from globalreasearch.ca

By Eric Zuesse

Global Research, January 11, 2015

Two recent reports show that Obama and his Administration lied when they promised to prosecute Wall Street executives who had cheated outside investors and deceived homebuyers when selling mortgages to them.

On May 20, 2009, at the signing into law of both the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act and the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, President Obama said:

“This bill nearly doubles the FBI’s mortgage and financial fraud program, allowing it to better target fraud in hard-hit areas. That’s why it provides the resources necessary for other law enforcement and federal agencies, from the Department of Justice to the SEC to the Secret Service, to pursue these criminals, bring them to justice, and protect hardworking Americans affected most by these crimes. It’s also why it expands DOJ’s authority to prosecute fraud that takes place in many of the private institutions not covered under current federal bank fraud criminal statutes — institutions where more than half of all subprime mortgages came from as recently as four years ago.”

Then, in the President’s 24 January 2012 State of the Union Address, he said:

“Tonight, I’m asking my Attorney General to create a special unit of federal prosecutors and leading state attorneys general to expand our investigations into the abusive lending and packaging of risky mortgages that led to the housing crisis. (Applause.) This new unit will hold accountable those who broke the law, speed assistance to homeowners, and help turn the page on an era of recklessness that hurt so many Americans. Now, a return to the American values of fair play and shared responsibility will help protect our people and our economy.”

However, two years later, the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Justice issued on 13 March 2014 its “Audit of the Department of Justice’s Efforts to Address Mortgage Fraud,” and reported that Obama’s promises to prosecute turned out to be just a lie. DOJ didn’t even try; and they lied even about their efforts. The IG found:

“DOJ did not uniformly ensure that mortgage fraud was prioritized at a level commensurate with its public statements. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Criminal Investigative Division ranked mortgage fraud as the lowest criminal threat in its lowest crime category. Additionally, we found mortgage fraud to be a low priority, or not [even] listed as a priority, for the FBI Field Offices we visited.”

Not just that, but, “Many Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA) informed us about underreporting and misclassification of mortgage fraud cases.” This was important because, “Capturing such information would allow DOJ to … better evaluate its performance in targeting high-profile offenders.”

Privately, Obama had told Wall Street executives that he would protect them. On 27 March 2009, Obama assembled the top executives of the bailed-out financial firms in a secret meeting at the White House and he assured them that he would cover their backs; he promised “My administration is the only thing between you and the pitchforks”. It’s not on the White House website; it was leaked out, which is one of the reasons Obama hates leakers. What the DOJ’s IG indicated was, in effect, that Obama had kept his secret promise to them.

Here is the context in which he said that (from page 234 of Ron Suskind’s 2011 book, Confidence Men):

The CEOs went into their traditional stance. “It’s almost impossible to set caps [to their bonuses]; it’s never worked, and you lose your best people,” said one. “We’re competing for talent on an international market,” said another. Obama cut them off.

“Be careful how you make those statements, gentlemen. The public isn’t buying that,” he said. “My administration is the only thing between you and the pitchforks.”

It was an attention grabber, no doubt, especially that carefully chosen last word.

But then Obama’s flat tone turned to one of support, even sympathy. “You guys have an acute public relations problem that’s turning into a political problem,” he said. “And I want to help. But you need to show that you get that this is a crisis and that everyone has to make some sacrifices.” According to one of the participants, he then said, “I’m not out there to go after you. I’m protecting you. But if I’m going to shield you from public and congressional anger, you have to give me something to work with on these issues of compensation.”

No suggestions were forthcoming from the bankers on what they might offer, and the president didn’t seem to be championing any specific proposals. He had none: neither Geithner nor Summers believed compensation controls had any merit.

After a moment, the tension in the room seemed to lift: the bankers realized he was talking about voluntary limits on compensation until the storm of public anger passed. It would be for show.

He had been lying to the public, all along. Not only would he not prosecute the banksters, but he would treat them as if all they had was “an acute public relations problem that’s turning into a political problem.” And he thought that the people who wanted them prosecuted were like the KKK who had chased Blacks with pitchforks before lynching. According to the DOJ, their Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) was “established by President Barack Obama in November 2009 to wage an aggressive, coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes.” But, according to the Department’s IG, it was all a fraud: a fraud that according to the DOJ itself had been going on since at least November 2009.

The IG’s report continued by pointing out the Attorney General’s lies, noting that on 9 October 2012, “the FFETF held a press conference to publicize the results of the initiative,” and:

“The Attorney General announced that the initiative resulted in 530 criminal defendants being charged, including 172 executives, in 285 criminal indictments or informations filed in federal courts throughout the United States during the previous 12 months. The Attorney General also announced that 110 federal civil cases were filed against over 150 defendants for losses totaling at least $37 million, and involving more than 15,000 victims. According to statements made at the press conference, these cases involved more than 73,000 homeowner victims and total losses estimated at more than $1 billion.

“Shortly after this press conference, we requested documentation that supported the statistics presented. … Over the following months, we repeatedly asked the Department about its efforts to correct the statistics. … Specifically, the number of criminal defendants charged as part of the initiative was 107, not 530 as originally reported; and the total estimated losses associated with true Distressed Homeowners cases were $95 million, 91 percent less than the $1 billion reported at the October 2012 press conference. …

“Despite being aware of the serious flaws in these statistics since at least November 2012, we found that the Department continued to cite them in mortgage fraud press releases. … According to DOJ officials, the data collected and publicly announced for an earlier FFETF mortgage fraud initiative – Operation Stolen Dreams – also may have contained similar errors.”

Basically, the IG’s report said that the Obama Administration had failed to enforce the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. This bill had been passed overwhelmingly, 92-4 in the Senate, and 338-52 in the House. All of the votes against it came from Republicans. The law sent $165 million to the DOJ to catch the executive fraudsters who had brought down the U.S. economy, and it set up the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, and had been introduced and written by the liberal Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy. President Obama signed it on 20 May 2009. At that early stage in his Presidency, he couldn’t afford to display that he was far to the right of every congressional Democrat, so he signed it.

Already on 15 November 2011, Syracuse University’s TRAC Reports had headlined “Criminal Prosecutions for Financial Institution Fraud Continue to Fall,” and provided a chart showing that whereas such prosecutions had been running at a fairly steady rate until George W. Bush came into office in 2001, they immediately plunged during his Presidency and were continuing that decline under Obama, even after the biggest boom in alleged financial fraud cases since right before the Great Depression. And, then, on 24 September 2013, TRAC Reports bannered “Slump in FBI White Collar Crime Prosecutions,” and said that

“prosecutions of white collar criminals recommended by the FBI are substantially down during the first ten months of Fiscal Year 2013.”

This was especially so in the Wall Street area:

“In the last year, the judicial District Court recording the largest projected drop in the rate of white collar crime prosecutions — 27.8 percent — was the Southern District of New York (Manhattan).”

Another recent report documents lying by the Administration regarding its promised program to force banks to compensate cheated homeowners for fraud in their mortgages, and sometimes even for evictions that were based on those frauds. The investigative journalist David Dayen headlined on 19 March 2014, “Just 83,000 Homeowners Get First-Lien Principal Reductions from National Mortgage Settlement, 90 Percent Less Than Promised.” He documented that, “the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development sold the settlement on a promise of helping 1 million homeowners, and the final number missed the cut by over 916,000. That … shows the essential dishonesty [Obama’s HUD Secretary Shaun] Donovan displayed in his PR push back in 2012. … We’re used to the Obama Administration falling far short of their goals for homeowner relief, whether because of a lack of interest or a desire to foam the runway for the banks or whatever. Even still, the level of duplicity is breathtaking.”

Investigative historian Eric Zuesse is the author, most recently, of They’re Not Even Close: The Democratic vs. Republican Economic Records, 1910-2010, and of CHRIST’S VENTRILOQUISTS: The Event that Created Christianity.

Wednesday, January 7, 2015

Ocwen Financial Corp Sets New 1-Year Low at $12.63 (OCN)

from intercooleronline.com

January 6th, 2015 - 0 comments - Filed Under - by AliciaHerrera Herrera

Shares of Ocwen Financial Corp (NYSE:OCN) hit a new 52-week low during mid-day trading on Tuesday ,Analyst RN reports. The company traded as low as $12.63 and last traded at $13.23, with a volume of 5,908,397 shares. The stock had previously closed at $13.97.

A number of analysts have recently weighed in on OCN shares. Analysts at Keefe, Bruyette & Woods set a $14.00 price target on shares of Ocwen Financial Corp in a research note on Monday. They now have a “hold” rating on the stock. Separately, analysts at Citigroup Inc. reiterated a “hold” rating on shares of Ocwen Financial Corp in a research note on Monday, December 29th. They now have a $15.00 price target on the stock, down previously from $23.00. Finally, analysts at Oppenheimer reiterated a “hold” rating on shares of Ocwen Financial Corp in a research note on Tuesday, December 23rd. One analyst has rated the stock with a sell rating, eight have assigned a hold rating and one has issued a buy rating to the stock. Ocwen Financial Corp presently has an average rating of “Hold” and an average target price of $24.75.

The stock has a 50-day moving average of $20. and a 200-day moving average of $26.33. The company has a market cap of $1.686 billion and a price-to-earnings ratio of 10.48. Ocwen Financial Corp also was the target of some unusual options trading on Monday. Investors purchased 9,011 put options on the stock. This is an increase of approximately 315% compared to the average volume of 2,169 put options.

Ocwen Financial Corp (NYSE:OCN) last released its earnings data on Thursday, October 30th. The company reported $0.58 earnings per share for the quarter, missing the analysts’ consensus estimate of $0.59 by $0.01. The company had revenue of $485.30 million for the quarter, compared to the consensus estimate of $542.76 million. During the same quarter last year, the company posted $0.44 earnings per share. Ocwen Financial Corp’s revenue was down 3.3% compared to the same quarter last year. Analysts expect that Ocwen Financial Corp will post $0.86 EPS for the current fiscal year.

Ocwen Financial Corporation is a financial services holding company. The Company is engaged in the servicing and origination of mortgage loans.

Receive News & Ratings for Ocwen Financial Corp Daily - Enter your email address below to receive a concise daily summary of the latest news and analysts' ratings for Ocwen Financial Corp and related companies with Analyst Ratings Network's FREE daily email newsletter.

Sunday, January 4, 2015

A flat-footed backflip for Wall Street

from xeniagazette.com

By Jim Hightower

Story Tools:

Font Size:

Social Media:

Share on linkedin Share on reddit Share on tumblr Share on pinterest_share Share on digg Share on stumbleupon More Sharing Services

Congress gave its bankster buddies an overly generous holiday gift.

Congress, which had been so tied up in a partisan knot by right-wing extremists that it became unable to move, suddenly sprang loose at the end of the year. Before heading home for the holidays, it put on a phenomenal show of acrobatic lawmaking.

In one big, bipartisan spending bill, our legislative gymnasts pulled off a breathtaking, flat-footed backflip for Wall Street. They then set a dizzying new height record for the amount of money deep-pocketed donors can give to the two major political parties.

It was the best scratch-my-back performance you never saw. You and I didn’t see it, because it happened in secret — with no public hearings, debate, or even a vote.

Tucked into the year-end spending bill known as a “cromnibus” was a provision allowing Wall Street’s most reckless speculators to have their losses on risky derivative deals insured by us taxpayers. Such losses were a central cause of the 2008 financial crash and subsequent unholy bank bailout.

That crash led to the passage of the Dodd-Frank financial reform law to spare taxpayers from future Wall Street bailouts.

But with one, compact, 85-line section inserted deep inside the 1,600-page, trillion-dollar spending bill, Congress did a dazzling flip-flop, putting taxpayers back on the hook for the banksters’ high-risk speculation.

In this same spending bill, Congress also freed rich donors — such as the Wall Street bankers it just did a huge favor for — from the $100,000 limit on the donations that individuals can give to national party committees. In a gravity-defying stunt, lawmakers flung the limit on these donations to a record-setting 15 times higher.

So now, bankers who are grateful to either party for letting them make a killing on taxpayer-backed deals can give a combined total of over $1.5 million to each.

It’s always an amazing sight when Wall Street and Congress get together — especially when they do it behind closed doors.

OtherWords columnist Jim Hightower is a radio commentator, writer, and public speaker. He’s also editor of the populist newsletter, The Hightower Lowdown www.OtherWords.org.

Friday, January 23, 2015

U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara Challenges Insider Trading Ruling

Related Links

Fallout Builds From Ruling on Insider Trading