Thursday, May 7, 2015

How The World Bank Broke Its Promise To Protect The Poor

from http://www.icij.org     huffpost




Find Out First

ICIJ and The Huffington Post estimate that 3.4 million people have been physically or economically displaced by World Bank-backed projects since 2004. For email updates on our investigation, sign up below.
Beneath a gloomy white sky, more than 100 armed police poured into the slum of Badia East in the teeming megacity of Lagos, Nigeria.
As they advanced, they cracked their batons on the unpaved streets and against the ramshackle walls of the shanties.
“If you love your life, move out!” the officers shouted.
Thousands of people grabbed what belongings they could carry and fled.
Then a line of hulking excavators moved in, using their hydraulic claws to smash homes into pieces. Within hours, the neighborhood was a ruin.
Bimbo Omowole Osobe, a former resident of the Badia East slum who was evicted in 2013 when her neighborhood was demolished, sits in the clinic where she now sleeps at night in the reception area. Osobe joined with volunteers from Justice and Empowerment Initiatives, an NGO where she works with other slum dwellers to fight demolitions. A child in the slums of Orisunbare Ijora Badia in Lagos, Nigeria.George Osodi / International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
Bimbo Omowole Osobe briefly lost track of her children in the chaos. When she returned to the community hours later, her concrete-block home and two small shops were gone.
“It’s like when a woman goes in for labor, and the baby comes out dead,” she said. “That’s how it felt to me.”
The Lagos state government flattened Badia East in February 2013 to clear land in an urban renewal zone financed by the World Bank, the global lender committed to fighting poverty. The neighborhood’s poor residents were cast out without warning or compensation and left to fend for themselves in a crowded, dangerous city.
Evictions like the one in Badia East aren’t supposed to happen in the middle of projects backed by the World Bank.
For more than three decades, the lender has maintained a set of “safeguard” policies that it claims have brought about a more humane and democratic system of economic development. Governments that borrow money from the bank can’t force people from their homes without warning. Families evicted to make way for dams, power plants or other big projects must be resettled and their livelihoods restored.

Key Findings

  • Over the last decade, projects funded by the World Bank have physically or economically displaced an estimated 3.4 million people, forcing them from their homes, taking their land or damaging their livelihoods.
  • The World Bank has regularly failed to live up to its own policies for protecting people harmed by projects it finances.
  • The World Bank and its private-sector lending arm, the International Finance Corp., have financed governments and companies accused of human rights violations such as rape, murder and torture. In some cases the lenders have continued to bankroll these borrowers after evidence of abuses emerged.
  • Ethiopian authorities diverted millions of dollars from a World Bank-supported project to fund a violent campaign of mass evictions, according to former officials who carried out the forced resettlement program.
  • From 2009 to 2013, World Bank Group lenders pumped $50 billion into projects graded the highest risk for “irreversible or unprecedented” social or environmental impacts — more than twice as much as the previous five-year span.
The bank’s commitment, it says, is to “do no harm” to people or the environment.
The World Bank has broken its promise.
Over the past decade, the bank has regularly failed to enforce its rules, with devastating consequences for some of the poorest and most vulnerable people on the planet, an investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, The Huffington Post and other media partners has found.
The World Bank often neglects to properly review projects ahead of time to make sure communities are protected, and frequently has no idea what happens to people after they are removed. In many cases, it has continued to do business with governments that have abused their citizens, sending a signal that borrowers have little to fear if they violate the bank’s rules, according to current and former bank employees.
“There was often no intent on the part of the governments to comply — and there was often no intent on the part of the bank’s management to enforce,” said Navin Rai, a former World Bank official who oversaw the bank’s protections for indigenous peoples from 2000 to 2012. “That was how the game was played.”
In March, after ICIJ and HuffPost informed World Bank officials that the news outlets had found “systemic gaps” in the institution’s protections for displaced families, the bank acknowledged that its oversight has been poor, and promised reforms.
“We took a hard look at ourselves on resettlement and what we found caused me deep concern,” Jim Yong Kim, the World Bank’s president, said in a statement.
The scope of “involuntary resettlement,” as the bank calls it, is vast. From 2004 to 2013, the bank’s projects physically or economically displaced an estimated 3.4 million people, forcing them from their homes, taking their land or damaging their livelihoods, ICIJ’s analysis of World Bank records reveals.
The true figure is likely higher, because the bank often fails to count or undercounts the number of people affected by its projects.
A team of more than 50 journalists from 21 countries spent nearly a year documenting the bank’s failure to protect people moved aside in the name of progress. The reporting partners analyzed thousands of World Bank records, interviewed hundreds of people and reported on the ground in Albania, Brazil, Ethiopia, Honduras, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Kenya, Kosovo, Nigeria, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan and Uganda.
In these countries and others, the investigation found, the bank’s lapses have hurt urban slum dwellers, hardscrabble farmers, impoverished fisherfolk, forest dwellers and indigenous groups — leaving them to fight for their homes, their land and their ways of life, sometimes in the face of intimidation and violence.

Asia and Africa Resettled

Nearly all of the estimated 3.4 million people who have been physically or economically displaced by World Bank-backed projects between 2004 and 2013 live in Africa or one of three Asian countries: Vietnam, China and India. Read about the data and our methodology here.
Continent

Evicted
Asia
2,897,872 people
221 resettlement projects
Africa
417,363 people
136 resettlement projects
South America
26,262 people
31 resettlement projects
Europe
5,524 people
11 resettlement projects
Oceania
2,483 people
2 resettlement projects
North America
855 people
11 resettlement projects
Island States
90 people
1 resettlement project
2,721,858 people displacedin China, India and VietnamNearly 100,000 people were displaced in Ethiopia,the fourth most of any country
People displaced
13,580
27,150
40,720
54,300
67,870
81,440
1,255,600
See Countries By: PEOPLE DISPLACED TOTAL PROJECTS
AL
AM
AR
AZ
BD
BF
BG
BI
BO
BR
BT
BW
BZ
CD
CF
CI
CM
CN
CO
CR
CV
DJ
DO
EC
EG
ET
GA
GE
GH
GM
GY
HN
HT
ID
IN
IR
IZ
JM
JO
KG
KH
KI
TG
SD
KE
BJ
GN
KV
KZ
LA
LB
LC
LK
LR
LS
MA
MG
MK
ML
MN
MR
MU
MW
MZ
NE
NG
NI
NP
PE
PH
PK
PL
PS
RS
RW
SL
SN
ST
TH
TJ
TL
TN
TR
TZ
UA
UG
UY
UZ
VC
VN
ZA
ZM
Source: the World Bank
Only countries where resettlement is known to have occurred are included.
Between 2004 and 2013, the World Bank and its private-sector lending arm, the International Finance Corp., committed to lend $455 billion to bankroll nearly 7,200 projects in developing countries.
Over the same span, people affected by World Bank and IFC investments lodged dozens of complaints with the lenders’ internal review panels, alleging the lenders and their borrowers failed to live up to World Bank and IFC safeguard rules.
In Lagos, the World Bank’s ombudsman, the Inspection Panel, said bank management “fell short of protecting the poor and vulnerable communities against forceful evictions.” Bank officials should have paid better attention to what was going on in Badia East, the panel said, given Lagos authorities’ long history of bulldozing slums and forcing people from their homes.
One year after the evictions, the bank loaned Lagos authorities $200 million to support the state government’s budget.
The World Bank said it was “not a party to the demolition” and that it advised the Lagos government to negotiate with displaced people, leading to compensation for most of those who said they’d been harmed.
Cases involving evictions have drawn the most attention, but the most common hardships suffered by people living in the path of World Bank projects involve lost or diminished income.
Overview full
A fisherman near Mundra, India, prepares the net for an overnight fishing trip. Locals say a World Bank Group-backed project in the area has depleted fish stocks.Sami Siva / International Consortium of Investigative Journalists

On India’s northwest coast, members of a historically oppressed Muslim community claim that heated water spewing from a coal-fueled power plant has depleted fish and lobster stocks in the once-fertile gulf where they make their living. The IFC loaned Tata Power, one of India’s largest companies, $450 million to help build the plant.
The U.S. and other global powers launched the World Bank at the end of World War II to promote development in countries torn by war and poverty. Member countries finance the bank and vote on whether to approve roughly $65 billion in annual loans, grants and other investments.
In 2014, the bank financed initiatives as varied as training for chicken farmers in Senegal and sewage system upgrades in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

What Is The World Bank?

The World Bank Group is the globe’s most prestigious development lender, bankrolling hundreds of government projects each year in pursuit of its high-minded mission: to combat the scourge of poverty by backing new transit systems, power plants, dams and other projects it believes will help boost the fortunes of poor people.
WORLD BANK GROUP
1. IBRD
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, one of the two lending arms traditionally considered to be the World Bank
Typically lends to middle-income governments, also some creditworthy low-income countries
Founded in 1944
FY 2014 commitments $18.6 billion
Lends at market rate
Guarantees loans
2. IDA
International Development Association, one of the two lending arms traditionally considered to be the World Bank
Typically lends to low-income governments
Founded in 1960
FY 2014 commitments $22.2 billion
Lends at low interest rate
3. IFC
International Finance Corporation, the World Bank's private lending arm
Typically lends to private firms in developing (low- to middle-income) countries
Founded in 1956
FY 2014 commitments $17.3 billion
Lends at market rate
Guarantees loans
Invests in private companies
World Bank President Kim said in March that the demand in struggling regions for infrastructure spending — to provide clean water, electricity, medical care and other vital needs — will mean the bank will finance an increasing number of big projects likely to remove people from their land or disrupt their livelihoods.
The World Bank also put out a 5½-page “action plan” that it said would improve its oversight of resettlement.
“We must and will do better,” said David Theis, a World Bank spokesman, in response to the reporting team’s questions.
Yet even as it promised reforms to its procedures, the bank has proposed sweeping changes to the policies that underlie them. The bank is now in the middle of a rewrite of its safeguards policy that will set its course for decades to come.
Some current and former World Bank officials warn that the proposed revisions will further undermine the bank’s commitment to protecting the people it was created to serve. The latest draft of the new policy, released in July 2014, would give governments more room to sidestep the bank’s standards and make decisions about whether local populations need protecting, they say.
“I am saddened to see now that pioneering policy achievements of the bank are being dismantled and downgraded,” said Michael Cernea, a former high-ranking bank official who oversaw the bank resettlement protections for nearly two decades. “The poorest and most powerless will pay the price.”
The bank says it has listened to the feedback and will release a revised draft with “the strongest, most state-of-the-art environmental and social safeguards.”

Unsettled History

A man-made disaster in eastern Brazil in the late 1970s helped prompt the World Bank to adopt its first systematic protections for people living in the footprint of big projects.
Rising waters upstream from the Sobradinho Dam, built with World Bank financing, forced more than 60,000 people from their homes. Their relocation was poorly planned and chaotic. Some families fled their villages as water began pouring into their homes and fields, leaving behind herds of animals to drown.
The fiasco gave Cernea, the World Bank’s first in-house sociologist, leverage to convince the bank to approve its first comprehensive policy for protecting people whose lives are upended by the bank’s projects. Cernea based the new rules, approved by the bank in 1980, on a simple premise: People who lose their land, their homes or their jobs should get enough help to restore, or exceed, their old standard of living.
Under the World Bank’s rules, governments seeking money from the bank must put together detailed resettlement plans for people who are physically or economically displaced.
Current and former bank employees say the work of enforcing these standards has often been undercut by internal pressures to win approval for big, splashy projects. Many bank managers, insiders say, define success by the number of deals they fund. They often push back against requirements that add complications and costs.
Daniel Gross, an anthropologist who worked for the bank for two decades as a consultant and staff member, said in-house safeguards watchdogs have “a place at the table” in debates over how much the bank is required to do to protect people. But amid the push to get projects done, they’re frequently ignored and pressed to “play ball and get along,” he said.
In an internal survey conducted last year by bank auditors, 77 percent of employees responsible for enforcing the institution’s safeguards said they think that management “does not value” their work. The bank released the survey in March, at the same time that it admitted to poor oversight of its resettlement policy.
“Safeguards are irrelevant for managers,” said one staffer who was surveyed for the report.
Andon demolished
Albanian authorities used a World Bank-backed project to clear the way for a planned seaside resort, partly or completely tearing down 15 homes in the impoverished village of Jale. Andon Koka's home was flattened, and half of his brother's home (in background) was demolished.Besar Likmeta / BalkanInsight.com

No Consolation

In 2007, residents of Jale, a tiny Albanian beach hamlet on the Ionian Sea, found themselves in the path of a coastal cleanup effort backed by a $17.5 million loan from the World Bank. More than a dozen poor families lived in Jale, many in homes with add-ons and extra floors they rented to vacationers.
Albanian authorities had other plans for the seaside.
They saw Jale as an ideal spot for a high-end resort to lure tourists to the country. They decided to use the coastal restoration project — which was managed by the son-in-law of Sali Berisha, Albania’s prime minister at the time — as a vehicle for turning the plan into a reality.
Before dawn one April morning, dozens of police officers streamed into the beach community, heading for structures previously identified in photos taken during aerial surveys paid for by the World Bank. The police rousted residents from their beds and forced them from their homes. Demolition crews leveled entire houses or tore down additions that the government said had been put up without proper permits.
Sanie Halilaj cried as work crews pulled down half of the house she had shared with her husband for more than half a century.
“When you lose a loved one, someone consoles you,” the 74-year-old said in a recent interview. “But when you lose your home, there is no consolation.”

The mass evictions of the devoutly Christian Anuak people from Ethiopia were enabled by money from the World Bank, former officials say. Across the globe, communities are being pushed aside by projects that the bank has financed.Video production by Hilke Schellmann
Bank officials initially denied the evictions were connected to the bank-financed coastal initiative. But a year later, the bank’s Inspection Panel found “direct links” between the project and the demolitions. The panel slammed the bank for embarking on a “systematic effort” to obstruct its investigation, providing answers “at times in total conflict with factual information which had been long known to management.”
After the panel’s report was released in 2008, then-World Bank Group President Robert Zoellick called the bank’s actions “appalling.” Zoellick vowed that the institution would swiftly “strengthen oversight, improve procedures and help the families who had their buildings demolished.”
“The bank cannot let this happen again,” he said.
Seven years later, little has changed. In Jale, most residents still haven’t received payment from the government for what they lost, even though the World Bank has covered their legal costs. At the bank, oversight remains weak.
A 2014 internal World Bank review found that in 60 percent of sampled cases, bank staffers failed to document what happened to people after they were forced from their land or homes.
Seventy percent of the cases sampled in the 2014 report lacked required information about whether anyone had complained and whether complaints were resolved, indicating the bank’s mechanisms for dealing with grievances were “box-checking” exercises that “existed on paper but not in practice,” the in-house reviewers wrote.
These “sizeable gaps in information” indicate “significant potential failures in the bank’s system for dealing with resettlement,” the report said. “The inability to confirm that resettlement has been satisfactorily completed poses a reputational risk for the World Bank.”
Lede art sheep
Victor Mendoza, the president of a farming co-op near the sprawling Yanacocha gold mine in northern Peru, with his 10-year-old son. The mine, built two decades ago with the financial backing of the International Finance Corp., the private-lending arm of the World Bank, is deeply unpopular in this region. Farmers like Mendoza claim it is polluting their water supply and threatening the health of their families and livestock. Read the story here.Ben Hallman / The Huffington Post

‘They Abandoned Us’

Most World Bank investments do not require evictions or damage people’s ability to earn a living or feed their families. But the percentage of those that do has increased sharply in recent years.
A 2012 internal audit found that projects in the bank’s pipeline triggered the bank’s resettlement policy 40 percent of the time — twice as often as projects the bank had already completed.
The World Bank and IFC have also been boosting support for mega-projects, such as oil pipelines and dams, that the lenders acknowledge are most likely to cause “irreversible” social or environmental harm, an analysis by HuffPost and ICIJ found.
A big project can upend the lives of tens of thousands of people.
Since 2004, World Bank estimates indicate that at least a dozen bank-supported projects physically or economically displaced more than 50,000 people each.
Studies show that forced relocations can rip apart kinship networks and increase risks of illness and disease. Resettled populations are more likely to suffer unemployment and hunger, and mortality rates are higher.
The World Bank acknowledges that resettlement is difficult, but says it’s often impossible to build roads, power plants and other much-needed projects without moving people from their homes.
“We stand by the need to continue financing infrastructure projects, including those that entail land acquisition and involuntary resettlement,” said Theis, the World Bank spokesman.
The bank says it strives to make sure its borrowers provide real help to people pushed aside by big projects. In Laos, the bank says, authorities built more than 1,300 new homes with electricity and toilets, 32 schools and two health centers for thousands of people forced to move to make way for a World Bank-financed dam.
“Through careful project design and proper implementation, land acquisition and involuntary resettlement have resulted in people’s lives improving significantly,” Theis said in a statement.
In a drought-haunted region of Brazil, farm families pushed aside by another World Bank-backed dam say that their lives haven’t been improved.
Thirty-five families live in a tiny, government-built relocation village called Gameleira, named after the dam and reservoir that forced them to leave their homes along the Mundaú River.
In their old homes, they could take water from wells and the river itself, but the relocation village has no fresh water source. A World Bank report acknowledged a delay in getting water access for the new village, but said the village’s water issues had been solved by late 2012.
The villagers say that’s not true. They are still waiting, four years after they were forced to relocate, for local authorities to keep their promise to build a small pipeline to draw water from the new reservoir to the relocation village. Meanwhile, water from the reservoir is being piped to urban areas.
A well in the village produces salty water and, even with desalination equipment, each family is limited to 36 liters of water a day. Families supplement their supply by buying from commercial vendors, sometimes spending as much as a third of their modest incomes.
These purchases provide them enough water to irrigate small gardens of yuca, beans and corn. If they want to plant cash crops — such as cashews — they have to wait for rain, which hardly ever comes.
“We feel that we are suffering so that people from the city can have water,” 39-year-old Francisco Venílson dos Santos, a farmer and father of four boys and two girls, said. “They abandoned us here.”
In a written statement, the World Bank said it is satisfied the village was provided an adequate supply of water “both in terms of quantity and quality.” The bank said it is helping Brazilian authorities deal with northeast Brazil’s prolonged drought by helping “to increase the resilience of small rural communities,” giving them advice on drilling emergency groundwater wells and creating “drought preparedness plans.”
Jim yong kim original
World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim at a Berlin press conference.Tobia Schwarz / Getty Images

Shortcuts

In July 2012, an unconventional leader took over as the World Bank’s new president. Jim Yong Kim, a Korean-American physician known for his work fighting AIDS in Africa, became the first World Bank president whose background wasn’t in finance or politics.
Two decades before, Kim had joined protests in Washington, D.C., calling for the World Bank to be shut down altogether for valuing indicators like economic growth over assistance to poor people.
Human rights advocates and bank staffers working on safeguards hoped that Kim’s appointment would signal a shift toward greater protections for people affected by World Bank projects.
In March, Kim said he was concerned about “major problems” in the bank’s oversight of its resettlement policies. He announced an action plan calling for greater independence for the bank’s safeguards watchdogs and a 15 percent funding boost for safeguards enforcement.
But while Kim and other bank officials have acknowledged general shortcomings, they have consistently denied that the bank shares blame for violent or wrongful evictions carried out by its borrowers.
In Ethiopia, the World Bank’s Inspection Panel found the bank had violated its own rules by failing to acknowledge an “operational link” between a bank-funded health and education initiative and a mass relocation campaign carried out by the Ethiopian government. In 2011, soldiers carrying out the evictions targeted some villagers for beatings and rapes, killing at least seven, according to a report by Human Rights Watch and ICIJ’s interviews with people who were evicted.
Daily life in a refugee camp in South Sudan. Some of the camp’s residents fled Ethiopia to avoid brutal evictions carried out by government forces. New evidence suggests the government’s actions were funded by the World Bank. Read the story here.Andreea Campeanu / International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
Kim said that while “we could have done more” to help the evicted communities, the bank was ultimately not at fault.
In India, the IFC’s internal ombudsman found that the lender had breached its policies by not doing enough to protect the large fishing community living in the shadow of the coal power plant it financed on the Gulf of Kutch. With Kim’s approval, IFC’s management rejected many of the ombudsman’s findings and defended the actions of its corporate client.
In both Ethiopia and India, the World Bank Group declined to direct its clients to fully compensate the affected communities.
In response to complaints about the Badia East evictions in Nigeria, the World Bank embraced a shortcut that fell short of its promise that people affected by projects will be fully compensated for their losses.
Typically, a community that claims it has been harmed by a bank project can file a complaint that will trigger an investigation by the bank’s Inspection Panel.
But when three Badia East residents submitted a complaint, panel staffers held off launching an investigation. Instead, they guided the residents into a new pilot program for handling disputes. The program put the community into direct negotiations with the Lagos state government.
Megan Chapman, then a lawyer for the Social and Economic Rights Action Center and now a co-founder of Justice & Empowerment Initiatives, represented the evicted residents. The Inspection Panel promised Chapman that the Badia East community could demand an investigation at any time if it wasn’t satisfied with the outcome, according to emails reviewed by ICIJ.
Negotiations didn’t go well for the evicted residents. The Lagos government insisted they had been illegal squatters, even though some of them had lived there for decades. It gave the group an ultimatum: Accept a small payment and sign away any legal rights, or get nothing.
Chapman believed that the government’s offer violated the bank’s resettlement policy because it didn’t provide new homes for the displaced or compensation equal to what they’d lost. The payments that Lagos authorities offered for larger demolished structures, for example, were 31 percent lower than what the World Bank’s own consultants said they were worth.
“It was like David and Goliath. There were these little people fighting against this giant,” Chapman said. The bank “really left vulnerable people on their own.”
The government’s ultimatum divided the community. The leader of Chapman’s organization said it was the best offer the evicted people were going to get. He said he was satisfied with the deal. Many residents and their advocates — including Chapman — objected.
But they had nowhere to turn for help.
Internal emails obtained by ICIJ indicate that by early 2014, the Inspection Panel’s chair, Eimi Watanabe, was already pushing to make sure that the panel would not investigate the World Bank’s role in the case.
After hearing that the leader of Chapman’s group was satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations, Watanabe urged her staff to issue a formal notice shutting down the possibility of any investigation before the fragile agreement fell apart, according to internal emails obtained by ICIJ.
“Pl[ease] issue notice soonest before it unravels,” Watanabe wrote on Feb. 6, 2014.
Watanabe’s directive didn’t immediately kill the investigation, but over the following months the panel made it clear that it didn’t want to dig deeper into the World Bank’s actions.
In July 2014, two of the three residents who had filed the complaint told the panel they were unhappy with the deal and that they wanted to go forward with an investigation. The panel rejected their request and shut the case down with an official notice that said, as an aside, that the bank had fallen short of its own resettlement standards.
Chapman and other advocates say the bank misled them about how the pilot program would work and abandoned the people of Badia East.
Watanabe did not respond to ICIJ’s questions about the Lagos case.
Gonzalo Castro de la Mata, the Inspection Panel’s current chair, said the panel “deliberated carefully at every stage of the case” and did not seek to arbitrarily shut down the investigation before it could start.
He said that although the Lagos government had agreed to follow World Bank rules for resettlement in Badia East and other neighborhoods, the evictions weren’t done under the official umbrella of the bank’s urban renewal initiative. Because of this and other factors, he said, the panel determined that “a lengthy process of investigation would not at the end of day necessarily yield better outcomes” for residents who lost their homes.
Overview full
Joseph Kilimo Chebet, a father of five, standing next to the burned remains of his homestead in Kenya, destroyed only hours prior by Kenya Forest Service officers. Read the story here.Tony Karumba / GroundTruth

An Uncertain Future

As it enters its eighth decade, the World Bank faces an identity crisis.
It is no longer the only lender willing to venture into struggling nations and finance huge projects. It is being challenged by new competition from other development banks that don’t have the same social standards — and are rapidly drawing support from the World Bank’s traditional backers.
China has launched a new development bank and persuaded Britain, Germany and other American allies to join, despite open U.S. opposition.
These geopolitical shifts have fueled doubts about whether the World Bank still has the clout — or the desire — to impose strong protections for people living in the way of development.
United Nations human rights officials have written World Bank President Kim to say they’re concerned that the growing ability of borrowers to access other financing has spurred the bank to join a “race to the bottom” and push its standards for protecting people even lower.
The bank’s proposed changes to its safeguard rules would grant many borrowers greater authority to police themselves. In the current draft, governments would be allowed to hold off on preparing resettlement plans until after the bank greenlights projects. They would also be permitted to use their own environmental and social policies instead of the bank’s safeguards, as long as the bank determines these policies are consistent with its own.
Some current and former bank officials say these changes would spell disaster for the people living in the growing footprint of the bank’s projects — allowing governments to abide by weaker national standards and decide whether vulnerable populations need protecting after they have already received financing.
In December, the World Bank’s biggest patron, the U.S. Congress, approved a measure directing the American representative on the World Bank board to vote against any future project that would be subject to weaker safeguards than the ones currently in place.
The bank says that the new rules would strengthen the protections for populations affected by its projects.
Theis, the bank spokesman, said that under the proposed rules, “a rigorous upfront scoping of the project is always required” and borrowers still must prepare plans to address resettlement and other adverse impacts of projects “well in advance of any construction activities.”
World Bank officials are now writing a new version of the safeguards that they say will take into account the criticisms of their previous draft. They expect to release the new draft in the late spring or summer.
In the meantime, the bank continues to ramp up its investment in large infrastructure projects, like the one that claimed Bimbo Osobe’s home in Badia East.
Osobe spent months after her eviction sleeping under only a net for shelter, she said.
As of mid-March, she was staying in a medical clinic, sleeping in the reception area after the clinic closes at night. She’s been forced to send three of her children away to stay with relatives, she said.
“It is not a good thing for a family to be divided,” Osobe said.
Sasha Chavkin is a reporter, Cécile Schilis-Gallego is a data journalist, Mar Cabra is a data editor and Michael Hudson is a senior editor at the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. Ben Hallman is a senior writer and Shane Shifflett is a data reporter at The Huffington Post. Jacob Kushner and Anthony Langat are Kenya-based reporters for the GroundTruth Project, a nonprofit global news service headquartered in the U.S.
Ciro Barros and Giulia Afiune are reporters at Agência Pública in Brazil. Musikilu Mojeed is managing editor at the Premium Times in Nigeria. Besar Likmeta is Albanian editor atBalkanInsight.com. Jeanne Baron is a U.S.-based radio journalist. Barry Yeoman is a reporting fellow with the Investigative Fund. Friedrich Lindenberg is a data journalist with the African Network of Centers for Investigative Reporting. Blaž Zgaga is an investigative journalist based in Slovenia.
Produced by Hilary Fung, Alissa Scheller and Shane Shifflett.
Video editing and production by Hilke Schellmann.


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Bio

William K. Black, author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One, teaches economics and law at the University of Missouri Kansas City (UMKC). He was the Executive Director of the Institute for Fraud Prevention from 2005-2007. He has taught previously at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin and at Santa Clara University, where he was also the distinguished scholar in residence for insurance law and a visiting scholar at the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics.
Black was litigation director of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, deputy director of the FSLIC, SVP and general counsel of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, and senior deputy chief counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision. He was deputy director of the National Commission on Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement.
Black developed the concept of "control fraud" frauds in which the CEO or head of state uses the entity as a "weapon." Control frauds cause greater financial losses than all other forms of property crime combined. He recently helped the World Bank develop anti-corruption initiatives and served as an expert for OFHEO in its enforcement action against Fannie Mae's former senior management.

Transcript

Why UK Election is a Win-Win for BankstersJESSICA DESVARIEUX, PRODUCER, TRNN: Welcome to The Real News Network. I'm Jessica Desvarieux in Baltimore. And welcome to this edition of the Bill Black Financial and Fraud Report. Now joining us from Quito, Ecuador is Bill Black. Bill is an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri, Kansas City. He's a white-collar criminologist and a former financial regulator, and the author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One. And of course, he's a regular contributor to The Real News.
Thanks for joining us, Bill.
BILL BLACK, ASSOC. PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AND LAW, UMKC: Thank you.
DESVARIEUX: So Bill, what are you tracking this week?
BLACK: Well, given the coming elections this week in the United Kingdom I thought I'd report on what these elections mean for holding the bankers accountable that caused so much devastation in what's called the city of London, or for short, the city.
DESVARIEUX: Okay. And how do they actually proceed? Have they prosecuted bankers?
BLACK: No. Of course not. The city won, which should be in quotation marks, the international race to the bottom in financial regulation. And then after it had won, Tony Blair--when he was of course supposedly the sort of socialist, Labour party guy who was prime minister--blasted the Financial Services Agency, their premier non-regulator, that had adopted light touch regulation. They actually called it that. Which meant that the bankers were able to get away with crimes with complete impunity. Blair blasted them publicly for being much, much, much too tough a regulator. It was one of the weakest regulators in the history of the world, and all these frauds were developing on his watch. And the reaction of labor was, we have to completely destroy regulation.
All right, so then Blair did this handoff to Gordon Brown who had been their Geithner. And--and their Geithner in every way, helping to destroy regulation. And Gordon Brown persisted in these policies, and this produced a disaster, but a disaster that happened in large part on the Conservatives' watch. But the Conservatives are even less inclined to prosecute anyone, so they're--the record, what they did as soon as they came into office was try to gut the Serious Fraud Office.
Now, the Serious Fraud Office was already a pale imitation of its former self, and it was never terribly strong, at the time they did this. But they decided they should really ruin it. And a review of the Serious Fraud Office said that they had produced the virtual decriminalization of serious frauds in the United Kingdom, particularly, of course, in the banking industry.
Meanwhile, the Conservatives to take power had to go into coalition with the Lib Dems, which, that name itself gives you some of the problems. They're supposed to be a little bit of this, a little bit of that. And Nick Clegg, as almost everybody views as a disaster, so the Lib Dems are expected to lose maybe 40 percent of their seats in the parliament in a few days. But tactically, the latest guess is that Clegg will survive because so many Tories--Conservatives--will vote for him, to try to keep him alive to be a coalition partner, which is probably the only way that the Conservatives have of getting any power.
Meanwhile in Scotland, one of my ancestral homes, the Scottish National Party really got a push out of the unsuccessful referendum in favor of Scottish independence. But it really developed a really strong following, and is the only progressive force of--at least, consistently progressive force--now in the United Kingdom. And so now the bogeyman that the Conservatives and Labour are sharing is, won't it be terrible if the Scottish people elect representatives who actually represent them, and won't this be terrible for the United Kingdom. So one of the only push for potential prosecutions pretty much comes out of the Scottish National Party, which could end up in coalition with Labour.
But right now, the situation is that in the Conservative or Tory party, the guy waiting in the wings is this really weird American Brit who's in the process of giving up his U.S. citizenship. Boris. And Boris is the guy who runs the city of London, but is also running for parliament. And he is the complete whore for the financial industry. And so if the Conservatives suffer an embarrassing loss under Osborne's leadership, the guy waiting in the wings is going to try to undo even the tiny regulatory steps that have been taken in the United Kingdom, and go back to the worst of the days of where the bankers just absolutely ruled.
So the scorecard is pretty much nobody's been prosecuted, certainly no one senior has been prosecuted for the most destructive frauds in United Kingdom history. Doesn't look like that that's about to change. And under some scenarios, the United Kingdom will go back full force into this regulatory race to the bottom that has already made the city of London the financial cesspool of the world.
DESVARIEUX: All right. Bill Black, joining us from Quito, Ecuador. Thanks so much for being with us.
BLACK: To talk about UK politics. International, baby.
DESVARIEUX: Yes, we love hearing from you, Bill. Thanks again.
BLACK: Thank you.
DESVARIEUX: And thank you for joining us on The Real News Network.

End

DISCLAIMER: Please note that transcripts for The Real News Network are typed from a recording of the program. TRNN cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.

Monday, April 27, 2015

Fines and Crimes, Part 2: How the government could prosecute the 'Banksters' (Commentary)

from syracuse.com


Eric Holder
Former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, in his book "Stress Test,'' defended the government's strategy of concentrating on fixing the financial system rather than punishing those who caused it. The author argues that doing one does not prevent doing the other. ( Photo illustration by Peter Allen / Photo via AP)

By Special to syracuse.com 
on April 24, 2015 at 11:05 AM, updated April 24, 2015 at 11:07 AM

Jonathan Schonsheck, Ph.D., is Professor of Philosophy at Le Moyne College. He is appointed to the College of Arts & Sciences and the Madden School of Business, and is the inaugural Faculty Fellow of the Madden School's Center for Global Engagement and Impact. These pieces, and several previous op-eds and scholarly articles, are elements of an ongoing research program centering on the financial crisis and its aftermath, including the proposal of specific reforms. The working title of the research program is "Conscientious Capitalism." The work draws on Schonsheck's scholarship in finance and moral philosophy. The author can be contacted atschonsjc@lemoyne.edu
By Jonathan Schonsheck
In a companion piece, I argued against the Department of Justice's strategy of negotiating fines, to be paid by the banks accused of wrongdoing. While the fines may at first seem "ginormous," they are in fact much smaller, in that they are tax-deductible, and but a small fraction of the banks' income. The executives, the "Banksters'' responsible for the crucial decisions, emerge unscathed. Furthermore, they are being conditioned by this strategy to consider these fines not as an expression of social condemnation, which should prompt disgrace and humiliation, but rather as merely a "fee." Thus, these executives are being conditioned to think of such transgressions, not as moral issues, but rather as something to be decided, just like any other "business" decision, on the basis of anticipated Return on Investment. And quite perversely, as more and more banks are fined under this strategy, the more comfortable Banksters become, since paying for violations is simply the new way of conducting business.
2015-04-15-schonsheck.JPGJonathan Schonsheck, Ph.D., is professor of philosophy at Le Moyne College. He also is on the faculty of the Madden School of Business. 


In my judgment, the only way to prevent an encore crisis is to prevent the Banksters from deciding whether to violate the law on the basis of Return on Investment. And the only way to re-orient their thinking is to pose the credible threat of criminal prosecution. So let us now turn to the questions: Why hasn't the Department of Justice undertaken criminal prosecutions, and how could it proceed?
Geithner's "defense"
Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury during the Crisis, defends the decision to not prosecute the Banksters in his book "Stress Test." Geithner explains that they were focused solely on preventing the total collapse of the global economy. He claims that ". . . the truly moral thing to do during a raging financial inferno is to put it out. The goal should be to protect the innocent . . ." I quite agree; surely it would be foolish – indeed, morally outrageous – for all the firefighters to descend from their ladders, stow their fire axes, shed their coats, pull off their boots, doff their helmets and chase the arsonists. The extreme silliness of Geithner's "defense" arises from the tense of the verb: "during" a genuinely systemic crisis, "during" a raging financial inferno. By all means, focus attention and energy on extinguishing the flames. But then? Once the financial fire has been brought under control, could we not then pursue the arsonists? It is fallacious to claim that, if battling the flames in the moment is the morally upright choice, then we are thereby debarred from ever seeking justice.
Furthermore, mere arsonists merely light fires. In sharp contrast, these "arsonist" Banksters ignited the financial markets in the course of wrongfully accumulating great wealth for themselves, having victimized a multitude of their fellow citizens. These transgressions cry out for justice.
Obstacles to criminal prosecution
To succeed, a criminal prosecution must overcome a number of obstacles. Broadly, the prosecutor must show that a crime has been committed and that the defendant committed it. "Crimes" are composed of a number of different "elements;" to be successful, the prosecution must prove each of these constitutive elements. It must then prove that the defendant did it – and prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. And the prosecution must prove all this to the satisfaction of each and every juror; if even one believes that there is reasonable doubt, the prosecution fails. And there are legitimate concerns about the typical jury pool. Many of those with higher education and critical reasoning skills are excused from service – one can safely bet against there being many lawyers or MBAs on any jury.
Every one of these obstacles to successful prosecution is vastly enlarged as regards the apparent crimes of the financial markets crisis. The financial instruments themselves are dizzyingly complex; the laws regulating the creation and exchange of these financial instruments – such as there were – were correspondingly complex. In consequence, it is most difficult for the prosecution to explain to a jury precisely what actions constitute a crime. Could a jury, composed of regular folks, be persuaded – unanimously, and beyond a reasonable doubt – that the law established these particular actions as criminal, and that the defendants did indeed choose those actions? In the parlance of the day: "Good luck with that!"
The Department of Justice did once try a trial, prosecuting two fund managers from Bear Stearns under securities laws. The proceedings lasted a month; the jury deliberated for just a day before finding them both "not guilty" on all counts. A plausible explanation: "jury befuddlement."
The Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 debarred all federal agencies from regulating the "financial derivatives" markets. In consequence, it is even more difficult to prosecute wrongdoing as regards one of the more notorious financial instruments of the crisis, the Credit Default Swap (CDS), a device for increasing or decreasing one's exposure to the risk of losses. Stop! Let us not take even one more step into this financial quagmire.
Criminal prosecution as common law fraud
I want to offer a strategy not for surmounting these obstacles to prosecution, but for circumnavigating them. Of course he Banksters will have to be charged under securities laws. But the prosecution could immediately divert the jury's attention away from the esoteric minutiae of securities law, and focus instead upon its underlying foundation of "common law fraud," which centers on soliciting money in exchange for a promise that the promisor knows he cannot keep – or fails to ensure that he can keep.
Timothy Geithner, Ben Bernanke, William DudleyFederal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, center, flanked by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, left, and William Dudley, president and chief executive officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, testifies on Capitol Hill in Washington, Tuesday, March 24, 2009, before a House Financial Services Committee hearing on AIG. 
Every member of the jury will be familiar with the idea of a fire insurance policy on one's house. Fearful of a catastrophic loss in the event of a fire, the prudent homeowner purchases a policy. The homeowner pays a periodic premium to the insurer; in exchange, the insurer assumes the risk of loss due to a fire, promising to reimburse the homeowner if the house burns. The homeowner's payment of the premium is a certainty; the insurer's payment of a claim is not. If the house never catches fire, the insurer never pays a claim – but does keep all the premiums paid by the homeowner.
A CDS is most clearly thought of as an insurance policy – in practice, though not in securities law. It is a policy not on a house, but on an investment. The investor pays a premium to the issuer, e.g., AIG; in exchange, the issuer promises to reimburse the investor in the event of a "financial fire," i.e., the investment loses value. The investor's payment of the premium is a certainty; the issuer's payment of a claim is not. If the investment never loses value, the issuer never pays a claim – but does get to keep all the premiums paid by the investor.
By law, fire insurance companies are required to maintain "reserves," cash on hand to pay claims. By law, CDS issuers were not required to maintain reserves. And AIG didn't; it paid out the premiums as salaries and bonuses, quite literally betting that the insured investments would not decline in value, and thus it would never have to pay a claim.
AIG lost that bet – and without any reserves, had to be bailed out by U.S. taxpayers.
This is a wonderfully straightforward example of common-law fraud. AIG took money from investors, in exchange for the promise of reimbursement in the event of the investment's decline in value. The investors relied upon the promise. But AIG made that promise without insuring that it could keep it. When investors sought reimbursement, AIG could not keep its promise. That's it; all of the elements of common law fraud have been proved.
Think now of the profound effects that this argument strategy would have on the dynamics of the courtroom. Since the prosecution will have already established that the Banksters took money in exchange for a promise that they could not keep, it is the defense that is put on the defensive. It is the defense that will be citing esoteric provisions of securities law, attempting to persuade the jury that it was not technically against the law for them to take money from investors, in exchange for a promise to protect them from financial loss, and then break that promise. Every juror will understand that they are trying to hide behind "legal technicalities," legislation written by their lobbyists, trying to evade what has already been proved. So now "jury befuddlement" works against the Banksters. For what remains unobscured, despite all the dust raised by the defense, is the common law fraud.
Executives can testify that they violated no securities statutes in failing to maintain adequate reserves. But that is wholly irrelevant; the executives will have just conceded that they did not have reserves sufficient to keep their promises. Bang the gavel – guilty of fraud. Salespeople can testify that they did not know what CDSs had been sold, and on which instruments, by other salespeople – and so did not know the total exposure of AIG. Bang the gavel; they have testified that they did not know whether they could keep their promises to investors. Guilty of fraud. Executives can testify that no one predicted the housing market crash, and the consequent bond market crash.Bang the gavel – they took money from investors in exchange for promises they took no adequate measures to insure that they could keep. Guilty of fraud.
Suppose the Department of Justice were to adopt this strategy. The Banksters will be contemplating the very real threat of criminal prosecution, the prospect of incarceration, the terrifying knowledge of what can happen after the steel doors slam. The allure of Return on Investment from violations of common law fraud will lose its luster – the thinking of the Banksters will indeed have been "re-oriented."
And now note how dramatically different a business environment this would create. When Bank #1 is fined but the Banksters emerge unscathed, and then so with Bank #2, and then so with Bank #3, and Bank #4, and Bank #5 – banks are not deterred from bad actions, but incentivized to elect them. And then an encore Crisis will ensue. But when Bankster #1 is sent to prison, and then Bankster #2 is imprisoned, and then Bankster #3, and Banksters #4 and #5 . . . well, it's reasonable to believe that all the rest of the Banksters will indeed be deterred from bad acts – and an encore crisis thereby averted.
 
Reddit






Fines and Crimes, Part 1: Why Wall Street 'Banksters' aren't deterred by fines (Commentary)

from syracuse.com



Eric Holder
Attorney General Eric Holder has pursued a strategy of extracting fines from the banks and Wall Street firms that precipitated the financial crisis. The writer argues this has not deterred -- and in fact may encourage -- bad corporate behavior. (Photo illustration by Peter Allen / Photo via AP)

By Special to syracuse.com 
on April 17, 2015 at 4:21 PM, updated April 17, 2015 at 4:33 PM

Jonathan Schonsheck, Ph.D., is Professor of Philosophy at Le Moyne College. He is appointed to the College of Arts & Sciences and the Madden School of Business, and is the inaugural Faculty Fellow of the Madden School's Center for Global Engagement and Impact. These pieces, and several previous op-eds and scholarly articles, are elements of an ongoing research program centering on the financial crisis and its aftermath, including the proposal of specific reforms. The working title of the research program is "Conscientious Capitalism." The work draws on Schonsheck's scholarship in finance and moral philosophy. The author can be contacted atschonsjc@lemoyne.edu
By Jonathan Schonsheck
The crisis in the financial markets that began in 2007, and the ensuing Great Recession, have begun to fade from public consciousness. In the context of all that has happened since then -- from various elections in the United States, to the continuing terrorist threats posed by al-Qaida and ISIL -- this is perfectly understandable. Nonetheless, the fact that memories are fading is both deeply troubling, and exceedingly dangerous. This fading is creating the ideal conditions for an encore crisis.
2015-04-15-schonsheck.JPGJonathan Schonsheck, Ph.D., is professor of philosophy at Le Moyne College. He also is on the faculty of the Madden School of Business. 

Unfortunately, this is the lesser of two problems. The greater problem is that the strategy chosen by the Department of Justice -- levying fines against the banks, rather than undertaking criminal prosecutions of the Banksters -- cannot succeed in preventing an encore crisis. And it's not just that the policy will fail -- it's that the policy itself is actually facilitating the next crisis.
In the first of two companion op-ed pieces, "Why Fines are Not Fine," I show how the policy of merely fining banks leaves their senior executives, the Banksters, unscathed - and thus, undeterred. In the second, "The Criminal Prosecution of Banksters," I reject the two main arguments against criminal prosecutions: former Secretary of the Treasury Timothy F. Geithner's position that the importance of saving the world's financial system eclipsed the importance of prosecutions, and the widely accepted position that the extreme complexity of these issues precludes conviction by a jury.
The two pieces are synergistic. So long as one believes that the strategy of fining banks is viable, one will not look for creative ways to undertake prosecutions. And what motivates the search for creativity in prosecution is the realization that the strategy of levying fines is deeply, and quite inescapably, counterproductive: destined to bring about precisely that which we so fervently wish to avoid.

Part 1: Why fines are not fine

When Charles Ferguson accepted the Academy Award for "Inside Job,'' he eloquently evinced his outrage that no one had gone to prison for having had a role in the crisis. That was February 2011; in the intervening four years, the count remains essentially zero. And Ferguson's is but one voice in a loud chorus singing for Sing Sing. To be sure, fines have been levied against many of the financial institutions. The intent, of course, has been to punish the perpetrators, functioning as a deterrent, to prevent future bad behavior. But have they had that effect? I think not. Indeed, and quite perversely, this policy has had precisely the opposite effect. The Department of Justice, in opting for negotiated settlements rather than criminal prosecutions, has established a business environment which has the effect of incentivizing, rather than deterring, the kinds of decision-making that will precipitate the next crisis in financial markets.
Putting fines into context
The strategy of the Department of Justice has been to negotiate with the offending banks. Often heard in defense of this way of proceeding is the claim, "We're hitting them right where it hurts - in the wallet." And we have witnessed an amazing escalation in the amount of these fines. The investment bank Goldman Sachs settled with the Securities and Exchange Commission for a (then) record-setting $550 million. Citigroup agreed to $7 billion; JPMorgan $13 billion. And more recently, Bank of America agreed to a structured set of fines totaling $16 billion.
Lloyd Blankfein, James Dimon, John Mack, Brian MoynihanIn this Wednesday, Jan. 13, 2010 file photo, from left, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein; JPMorgan Chase & Company Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon; Morgan Stanley Chairman John Mack and Bank of America Corporation Chief Executive Officer and President Brian Moynihan, testify on Capitol Hill in Washington before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. Many Wall Street firms paid big fines -- in the billions of dollars -- an expense borne by the shareholders, not the people who made bad decisions. 
To the ordinary citizen, with no context for assessing these amounts other than one's own salary and savings, terms like "massive" and "ginormous" seem perfectly apt. But the ordinary person's own "wealth" is absolutely the wrong "frame" for understanding these amounts. Consider: All of these banks, after the fines, remained profitable. Additionally, these fines are tax-deductible. The loss to the Treasury is made up by ordinary taxpayers. Furthermore, it is paid by the bank, i.e., its stockholders, and not the senior executives who made the fateful decisions -- i.e., the individual Banksters. The upshot of all this: When put into proper context, these fines are not as large as they initially seem, and the "hurt" is suffered by stockholders and taxpayers, not the Banksters. As individuals, they are not "getting hurt right in the wallet."
In announcing the Citigroup settlement, outgoing Attorney General Eric Holder claimed that "the size and scope of this resolution goes beyond what could be considered the mere cost of doing business" -- apparently to silence critics of Justice's strategy of merely imposing fines. I believe Holder is quite mistaken.
Decision-making in business
Every business, as a going concern, has a balance sheet -- an accounting of income and expenses, of debits and credits. Decision-making in a business focuses on the anticipated impact of the various options it is considering on that balance sheet: what expenses will be incurred, what income will be realized. The relevant technical term here: "Return on Investment," or "RoI." In essence, the executives of a business seek to maximize RoI, to gain the greatest amount of revenues from the least in expenditures.
Let us imagine a manufacturer, shipping products. On the expense side of the balance sheet will be fees of various sorts: tolls for trucks on limited access highways, and over bridges and through tunnels; lock and dock fees for barges; gate and landing fees for air freight, etc. The payment of such fees is just one amongst innumerable other expenses of doing business. Of course in a well-run business, the various shipping options will be carefully researched. And it is certainly possible to make a bad decision - to air-freight iron ore, to send (initially) fresh seafood by barge. These are indeed bad decisions - but bad business decisions, not morally bad decisions.
From the perspective of various agencies of the state, the collection of fees is a very good thing. Typically these fees will be used for the maintenance and improvement of the relevant structures -- roads, bridges, canals, runways. From the authority's perspective, the more the better: the greater the usage, the greater the aggregate amount of fees collected. It's good business, and it's good for business. Indeed, the authority may even adopt various stratagems to increase usage, and thus increase the collection of fees. Most importantly, the collection of fees is certainly not intended to discourage the use of the facility.
The crucial differences between fees and fines
There are profound differences between fees and fines. Of course there are superficial similarities: Resources are transferred from a business, and to an authority. However, the transaction does not originate in the business's use of some facility. The transaction originates in an authoritative judgment that the business has done wrong, has made a morally bad decision. The imposition of a fine is part of the expression of that negative judgment. Furthermore, the raison d'etre of imposing a fine is to eliminate, or at least discourage, that conduct: by the business fined, and also by other businesses that might be tempted to elect that conduct. To impose a fine is not an effort to raise revenue, like a fee dedicated to the maintenance of some facility. Rather, it is to "reify," to make real, the authority's judgment that a wrong has been committed. And while authorities are delighted to collect more fees, they would be correspondingly delighted to collect no fines -- for having eliminated violations.
A business's paying a fee is a business doing business. A business's paying a fine, in sharp contrast, is a business that should suffer embarrassment, humiliation, disgrace.
A social cancer: When fines metastasize into fees
Grave problems arise if a business begins to consider the imposition of a "fine" - which is an expression of society's moral condemnation of its actions, and ought to result in disgrace -- as merely the payment of a "fee," which is not a moral matter at all. For if the "financial transaction" has been stripped of moral condemnation, the business regards that transgression as merely one of the indefinitely many business decisions that executives must make. And of course the basis for that decision is Return on Investment. So instead of being deterred by the prospect of humiliation, the Bankster decides whether to engage in prohibited conduct solely on the basis of anticipated profits. The crucial decisions have become of this sort: Can we maximize RoI by expanding capacity, or by engaging in "creative accounting?" By implementing a promising but unproven technology, or by engaging in a scheme that is likely unlawful, but that's nearly certain to be profitable? They reason: "If we get caught doing these things, we will still make money, despite our paying the fine, which we now think of as merely paying a fee."
Eric HolderAttorney General Eric Holder announces at the Justice Department in Washington Monday, July 14, 2014, that Citigroup will pay $7 billion to settle an investigation into risky subprime mortgages, the type that helped fuel the financial crisis. 

Now others have noted that executives have come to consider fines as "just another business expense." But what has been missed so far is the deeper dynamic: that decisions about transgressions are being made on the basis of Return on Investment. So when Holder claims that the "size" of the settlement "goes beyond what could be considered the mere cost of doing business," he is precisely wrong. It's not a matter of "size." As regards fines, size doesn't matter. Despite record-setting fines, it is still business. Executives are still deciding whether to violate the law based upon Return on Investment.
The Department of Justice's strategy of negotiating fines on banks, while Banksters emerge unscathed and unchastised, is creating a toxic business environment. After Bank #1 negotiates a fine, but the Banksters admit no guilt, and lose neither their jobs nor their personal wealth, and then Bank #2 negotiates a fine, but its Banksters emerge unscathed, and then Bank #3 does the same: Well, so with Bank #4, and Bank #5 . . .. Indeed, the more "successful" that Justice is in this strategy, the more likely the Banksters are to consider their bad acts as "merely business." So quite perversely, this "success" transforms what was intended as a deterrent, into an incentive. It encourages precisely the executive decision-making that we sought to prevent.
How can we clean up this business environment? How can we "re-orient" the thinking of the Banksters, so that the decision whether to break the law is no longer based upon anticipated Return on Investment? Only by the credible threat of criminal prosecution of the Banksters -- as I argue in the companion piece next week.
 



Thursday, April 23, 2015

The Financial Crisis for DUMMIES

from youtube

Author Michael Hudson on Young Turks  


An easy to understand overview of the financial meltdown 





Thursday, April 9, 2015

Papantonio: Bankers Warn Dems To Shut Elizabeth Warren Down

from ringoffireradio.com


— March 29, 2015



Since taking office in January of 2013, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) has made a name for herself with her fiery takedowns of big banks and the regulators who failed to keep those big banks in check. For example, back in 2013 she asked a panel of bank regulators whether or not ‘too big to fail’ has become ‘too big for trial.’ Comments like that have made many Wall Street enemies for the senator, but that is certainly a sign that she’s on the right track.
As it turns out, some banksters are actually thinking of boycotting the Democratic party because of her. All of this comes as progressives attempt to line up a liberal alternative to Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential elections.
What kind of impact will Wall Street’s boycott have on the 2016 race, and what should it tell us about politics in a post Citizens United world? America’s Lawyer, Mike Papantonio, discusses this withRichard Eskow, senior fellow at the Campaign for America’s Future and host of The Zero Hour.
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Thursday, April 2, 2015

Here’s Why Ocwen Financial Corp Stock Is Trading Down Today

from bidnesset.com


Here’s Why Ocwen Financial Corp Stock Is Trading Down Today

Here’s Why Ocwen Financial Corp Stock Is Trading Down Today

In a press release after the market closed on Monday, Ocwen Financial Corp (NYSE:OCN) announced that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Regulation, Inc. sent a letter to the company on Wednesday. It clearly stated that the company was not in compliance with the standards required for continued listing in NYSE as it failed to file Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2014. The stock is trading down by 3.07% at $8.53 as of 8:57AM EDT.
Ocwen, being not able to meet its obligation, remains unclear about when it will be able to file the 10-K. The company said that it was unable to make disclosures on time because it focused on the analysis of Home Loan Servicing Solutions Ltd’s (NASDAQ:HLSS) ability to continue providing funds for new servicing advances.
HLSS is Ocwen’s affiliate that provides finance for the purchase of its mortgage-servicing rights. Ocwen believes the review and focus on HLSS was crucial, as it notified that the company might face substantial negative impacts on it financial position, if HLSS fails to finance new servicing advances.
The company stated: “The Company requires additional time to prepare information related to its ability to operate as a going concern.” Normally, the process of delisting a company by NYSE takes about six months or even more. This time-frame might prove to be an opportunity for Ocwen to clear all the queries in the auditors' minds and disclose its financial statements.
Ocwen's disclosure of receiving the deficiency letter clearly made significant impact on the trading price of its stock, as it went down about 5.11% in pre-market session. Since the start of the year, the stock has experienced 42.26% decline at average daily volume of 7 million shares.
Get more OCN research by Bidness Etc